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Abstract
In this paper we present a simple, theory-based measure of the variations
in aggregate economic efficiency associated with business fluctuations. We de-
compose this indicator, which we refer to as “the gap”, into two constituent
parts: a price markup and a wage markup, and show that the latter accounts
for the bulk of the fluctuations in our gap measure. We also demonstrate the
connection between our gap measure and the gap between ouput and its natural
level, a more traditional indicator of aggregate inefficiency. Finally, we derive
a measure of the welfare costs of business cycles that is directly related to our
gap variable. Our welfare measure corresponds to the inefficient component
of economic fluctuations, and should thus be interpreted as a lower bound to
the costs of the latter. When applied to postwar U.S. data, for some plausi-
ble parametrizations, our measure indicates non-negligible welfare losses of gap
fluctuations. The results, however, hinge critically on some key parameters,
including the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply.
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1 Introduction
To the extent that there exist price and wage rigidities, or possibly other types of
market frictions, the business cycle is likely to involve inefficient fluctuations in the
allocation of resources. Specifically, the economy may oscillate between expansionary
periods where the volume of economic activity is close to the social optimum and
recessions that feature a significant drop in production relative to the first best. In
this paper we explore this hypothesis by developing a simple measure of aggregate
inefficiency and examining its cyclical properties. The measure we develop - which we
call “the inefficiency gap” or “the gap”, for short - is based on the size of the wedge
between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure. Deviations of this gap from zero reflect an inefficient allo-
cation of employment. By constructing a time series measure of the inefficiency gap,
we are able to obtain some insight into both the nature and welfare costs of business
cycles.
From a somewhat different perspective, as we discuss below, the inefficiency gap
corresponds to the inverse of the markup of price over social marginal cost. Procyclical
movements in the inefficiency gap accordingly mirror countercyclical movements in
this markup. Our approach, however, differs from much of the recent literature on
business cycles and markups by allowing for the possibility that the movement in
the overall markup depends on variations in a wage markup as well as in a price
markup.1 Put differently, in contrast to much of the existing literature, we allow for
the possibility of labor market frictions that introduce a wedge between the wage
and households’ consumption/leisure tradeoff. By doing so we can obtain some sense
of the relative importance of price versus wage rigidities for overall fluctuations in
the inefficiency gap. In addition, focusing on the gap between the labor demand
and supply curves leads directly to a measure of the welfare costs of variations in
aggregate inefficiency associated with business cycles, based on the lost surplus owing
to aggregate fluctuations.
Our approach builds on a stimulating paper by Hall (1997) that analyzes the cycli-
cal behavior of the neoclassical labor market equilibrium. Specifically Hall shows that
the business cycle is associated with highly procyclical movements in the difference
between the observable component of the household’s marginal rate of substitution
and the marginal product of labor. Hall interprets this difference — which we refer
to as the Hall residual — as reflecting a preference shock2. However, we present ev-
idence that suggests that this residual may instead reflect countercyclical markup
1See Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a survey of the literature on business cycles and coun-
tercyclical markups. For business cycle models that feature a role for wage markups as well as price
markups, see Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).
2To be fair, Hall does not take the preference shock interpretation literally, but rather as a starting
point for analyzing the significance of the cyclical movement in the gap between the measured labor
demand and supply curves. In his conclusion, he observes that cyclical movements in unemploymend
could underlie the measured preference shock.
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variation. As we show, under this interpretation, cyclical variation in this residual
reflects efficiency costs.
In related work, Mulligan, (2002) also develops a measure of aggregate inefficiency
based on the labor market distortion, and examines its long term behavior, using an-
nual data spanning more than a century. He finds that marginal tax rates correlate
well at low frequencies with his distortion measure. We instead focus on fluctua-
tions in the degree of aggregate inefficiency at business cycle frequencies, and stress
countercyclical markup variation (in a very broad sense) as the key factor underlying
fluctuations at these frequencies. We also show how the labor market distortion at
the business cycle frequency is related to the gap between output and its natural
level, a more conventional indicator of cyclical inefficiency. Finally, we describe how
to construct a welfare cost measure based on the observed labor market distortion.
In section 2 we develop a framework for measuring the inefficiency gap and its
price and wage markup components in terms of observables, conditional on standard
assumptions about preferences and technology. In section 3 we present empirical mea-
sures of this variable for the postwar U.S. economy. We show that the inefficiency
gap exhibits large procyclical swings, thus confirming our basic hypothesis. In addi-
tion, most of its variation is associated with countercyclical movements in the wage
markup.3 The price markup shows, at best, a weak contemporaneous correlation.
Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of our gap measure and its decomposition to
alternative assumptions about preferences and technology. In section 4 we consider
the possibility that preference shocks underlie the variation in our gap measures.
Specifically, we present VAR evidence that suggests that the Hall residual is endoge-
nous and thus cannot simply reflect exogenous variation in preferences. The evidence
is instead consistent with our maintained hypothesis that endogenous variation in
markups is largely responsible for the movement in the inefficiency gap. Section 5
characterizes both theoretically and empirically the link between the labor market
distortion and the output gap.
In Section 6 we examine the welfare consequences of business fluctuations. Our
approach differs significantly from Lucas (1987), who examines the welfare costs of
consumption variability associated with the cycle. We instead focus on the welfare
costs associated with fluctuations in the efficiency of resource allocation, as implied by
the time series variation in our gap measure. As we show, our framework implies that
business contractions below the steady state produce greater efficiency costs than the
efficiency gains arising from symmetric expansions above. This asymmetry, in turn,
implies that fluctuations raise efficiency costs on average, even if these fluctuations are
themselves symmetric. We show that under some not implausible parametrizations,
gap fluctuations of the magnitude observed in postwar U.S. data could potentially
3In this respect our results are consistent with recent evidence in Sbordone (1999, 2000), Galí
and Gertler (1999), Galí, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1997, 2001) that in somewhat different contexts similarly points to an important role for wage
rigiditiy.
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involve non-negligible welfare costs. The results, however, depend critically on several
key parameters, including the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply. Finally, in
addition to studying average performance over the postwar, we also examine the
efficiency costs associated with the major boom-bust episodes of the 1970s and early
1980s. Concluding remarks are in section 7.
2 The Gap and its Components: Theory
Let the inefficiency gap (henceforth, the gap) be defined as follows:
gapt = mrst −mpnt (1)
where mpnt and mrst denote, respectively, the (log) marginal product of labor and
(log) marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
As illustrated by Figure 1, our gap variable can be represented graphically as the
vertical distance between the perfectly competitive labor supply and labor demand
curves, evaluated at the current level of employment (or hours). In much of what
follows we assume that {gapt} follows a stationary process with a (possibly nonzero)
constant mean, denoted by gap (without any time subscript). The latter represents
the steady state deviation between mrst and mpnt. Notice that these assumptions
are consistent with both mrst and mpnt being non-stationary, as it is likely to be
the case in practice as well as in the equilibrium representation of a large class of
dynamic business cycle models.
We next relate the gap to the markups in the goods and labor markets. Under
the assumption of wage-taking firms, and in the absence of labor adjustment costs,
the nominal marginal cost is given by wt−mpnt, where wt is (log) compensation per
unit of labor input (including non-wage costs).4 Accordingly, we define the aggregate
price markup as follows:
µpt = pt − (wt −mpnt) (2)
= mpnt − (wt − pt) (3)
The aggregate wage markup is given by:
µwt = (wt − pt)−mrst (4)
i.e., it corresponds to the difference between the wage and the marginal disutility of
work, both expressed in terms of consumption. Notice that the wage markup should
be understood in a broad sense, including the wedge created by efficiency wages,
payroll taxes paid by the firm and labor income taxes paid by the worker, search
frictions,and so on.
4We show subsequently that our results are robust to allowing for labor adjustment costs.
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There are a variety of frictions (perhaps most prominently, wage and price rigidi-
ties) which may induce fluctuations in the markups: It is in this respect that these
frictions are associated with inefficient cyclical fluctuations, or more precisely, with
variations in the aggregate level of (in)efficiency. In particular, given that the mar-
ginal rate of substitution is likely to be procyclical, rigidities in the real wage—resulting
either from nominal or real rigidities—will give rise to countercyclical movements in
the wage markup.5 Nominal price rigidity, in turn, may give rise to a countercyclical
price markup in response to demand shocks since, holding productivity constant, the
marginal product of labor is countercyclical.6
To formalize the link between markup behavior and the gap, we first express
equation (1) as
gapt = −{[mpnt − (wt − pt)] + [(wt − pt)−mrst]} (5)
Combining equations (3), (4), and (5) then yields a fundamental relation linking the
gap to the wage and price markups:
gapt = −(µpt + µwt ) (6)
In the steady state, further:
gap = −(µp + µw) < 0 (7)
where variables without time subscripts denote steady state values.
It is natural to assume that µpt ≥ 0 and µwt ≥ 0 for all t, implying gapt ≤ 0
for all t. In this case the level of economic activity is inefficiently low (i.e., the gap
is always negative), so that (small) increases in our gap measure will be associated
with a smaller distortion (i.e., an allocation closer to the perfectly competitive one).
Notice also that countercyclical movements in these markups imply that the gap is
high in booms and low in recessions.
To the extent that we can measure the two markups (or, at least their variation),
we can characterize the behavior of the gap, as well as its composition. Identifying
the markups requires some assumptions about technology and preferences. We first
consider a baseline case with reasonably conventional assumptions. We then show
that our results are robust to a number of leading alternative restrictions.
Given equation (2), identification of price markup variations only requires an
assumption on technology. Under the assumption of a technology with constant elas-
ticity of output with respect to hours (say, α), we have (up to an additive constant):
5Models with countercyclical wage markups due to nominal rigidities include Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987) and Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). Alexopolous (2000) develops a model with
a real rigidity due to effiiciency wages that can generate a countercyclical wage markup.
6With productivity shocks, the markup could be procyclical (since the marginal product of labor
moves procyclically in that instance).
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mpnt = yt − nt (8)
where yt is output per capita and nt is hours per capita.7
Combining equations (2)and (8) yields:
µpt = (yt − nt)− (wt − pt) (9)
≡ − ulct (10)
Hence the price markup can be measured (up to an additive constant) as minus the
(log) real unit labor costs, denoted by ulct .
Let ct be consumption per capita and ξt be a deterministic, low frequency prefer-
ence shifter. Then, the (log) marginal rate of substitution can be written (up to an
additive constant) as:
mrst = σ ct + ϕ nt − ξt (11)
where the parameter σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and ϕ measures the
curvature of the disutility of labor. Following Hall (1997), we allow for the possibility
of low frequency shifts in preferences over consumption versus leisure, as represented
by movements in ξt. These preference shifts may be interpreted broadly to include
institutional or demographic changes that affect the labor market, but which are
unlikely to be of relevance at business cycle frequencies. We differ from Hall, though,
by restricting these shifts to the low frequency. In section 4 we provide evidence to
justify this assumption. It follows that the wage markup is given by:
µwt = (wt − pt)− (σ ct + ϕ nt) + ξt (12)
Given a measure of both the price and the wage markup, one can obtain a measure
of the gap using equation (6). Alternatively, one can combine equations (9), (12) and
(6) to obtain:
gapt = (σ ct + ϕ nt − ξt)− (yt − nt) (13)
3 The Gap and Its Components: Evidence
We now use the theoretical relations in the previous section to construct measures of
the gap and its two main components: the price and wage markups. Our evidence
7As we discuss in section 5, this specification of production allows for variable capital utilization.
Under certain conditions it is also compatible with variable labor utilization, particularly if labor
effort moves roughly proportionately with hours, as the evidence suggests (see, e.g., Basu and
Kimball, 1997).
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is based on quarterly postwar U.S. data over the sample period 1960:4 - 1999:4, and
are drawn from the DRI database. The basic data used to construct the gap vari-
able and its components include compensation per hour (LBCPU), hours all persons
(LBMNU), real and nominal output (GPBUQ and GPBU), all of which refer to the
refer to the nonfarm business sector, as well as the NIPA series for non-durable and
services consumption (GCNQ+GCSQ). In addition we also use population over six-
teen (P16) (to express variables in per capita terms), real GDP (GDPQ), implicit
GDP deflator (GDPD), the Fed-funds rate (FYFF), the spread between the 10-year
government bond yield (FYGL) and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate (FYGM3), and
a commodity price index (PSCOM) for our VAR exercise in Figure 7.
Identification of gap and wage markup variations requires that we make an as-
sumption on the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ and on ϕ, a parameter which
corresponds to the inverse of the (Frisch) wage elasticity of labor supply. A vast
amount of evidence from micro-data suggests wage elasticities mostly concentrated
in the range of 0.05 − 0.3.8 The business cycle literature tends to use much higher
values. We accordingly use a baseline value ϕ = 5, which corresponds to a labor
supply elasticity of 0.2, which is slightly above the mean of the labor supply elastic-
ity estimates from the micro data.9 However, we also experiment with other values,
including values used in the business cycle literature (see, e.g., Cooley and Prescott,
1995.)
There is a similar controversy over the choice of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, which corresponds to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
8MacCurdy (1981) estimates the Frisch elasticity of labor supply for men to be 0.15, a finding
that has been largely confirmed by subsequnet literature (e.g., Altonji,1986, and more recently
Pencavel, (forthcoming)). In his survey of the literature, Card (1994) concludes that this elasticity
is “surely no higher than 0.5 and probably no higher than 0.2.” See Mulligan (1998), however, for
an alternative view. Finally, less is kown about female labor supply elasticity, but Pencavel (1998)
has estimated a Frisch elasticity of 0.21 for this group. Pencavel’s sample period covers the mid
1970s to mid 1990s. Apparently, as the gap betweeen male and female labor force participation has
narrowed, female labor supply elasticities have become similar to male labor supply elasticities.
9Whether it is appropriate to use the existing micro evidence to calibrate the intertemporal
elasticity of labor supply in a business cycle model is a matter of controversy, particularly to the
extent employment adjusts along the extensive margin as well as the intensive margin (see, e.g. the
discussion in Mulligan (1998)). How to take into account the extensive margin as well as other
pertinent frictions relevant to intertemporal labor supply decisions is a tough issue. In our view it
is best to just think of ϕ as a way to parametrize in a reduced form sense how the opportunity cost
of labor changes over the business cycle. A value of ϕ = 5, for example, implies that everything else
equal, a one percent reduction in aggregate hours worked leads to a five percent reduction in the
opportunity cost of labor (since ϕ correspond to the elasticity of disutility of hours.) For example,
a 3.0% reduction in employment, as occurs in a typical recession, would imply that the opportunity
cost of labor is worth eighty-five percent of its steady state value. To the extent there are frictions
that make unemployment less desirable than the frictionless model implies, this kind a number may
not be unreasonable. While for internal consistency we appeal to the micro literature to calibrate
the model, we think the best strategy at this stage is to explore the sensitivity of the results to
different parameter values.
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tion. Direct estimates of the latter tend to fall in the range 0.1− 0.3.. This evidence
suggests a value of σ that varies from 10 to 3.3.10 The business cycle literature instead
tends to assume log utility over consumption (i.e., σ = 1), based on the justification
that these preferences are consistent with balanced growth. We also adopt this as-
sumption for our baseline calibration, but then also experiment with parametrizations
consistent with the direct evidence.
In addition, we need to make an assumption to identify the low frequency shifter
ξt. Let eµwt ≡ (wt − pt) − (σct + ϕ nt) be the observable component of the wage
markup. It follows that
eµwt = µwt − ξt (14)
From this perspective, the wage markup µwt is the cyclical component of eµwt and
ξt is (minus) the trend component. Following Hall (1997) we approximate the low
frequency movements of eµwt by fitting a fifth-order polynomial of time to eµwt .11
Finally, before proceeding, we note that the relationships derived in the previous
section hold only up to an additive constant. Accordingly, our framework only allows
us to identify the variations over time in the markup and its components, but not their
levels. Our baseline results thus employ measures of the price and wage markups and
the gap constructed using, respectively, equations (10), (12), and (6), and expressed
in terms of deviations from their respective sample means.
Figure 2 presents the times series measure of our gap variable under our baseline
assumptions of σ = 1 and ϕ = 5. Notice that this variable comoves strongly with the
business cycle, displaying large declines during NBER-dated recessions (represented
by the shaded areas in the graph). It is also interesting to observe that the gap hovers
near zero for most of the period post 1995. The resulting implication is that the rapid
output growth over this period must have been due to real factors (e.g. technology
improvements) as opposed to excess demand.
We next decompose the movements of the gap into its wage and price markup
components. The wage markup measures were constructed using (12).12 The price
markup corresponds to minus the log of real unit labor costs, as implied by (10).
Figure 3 shows the behavior of the gap against the wage markup. To facilitate
visual inspection, we plot the inverse of the wage markup (i.e., minus the log wage
markup). By definition, the difference between the gap and the inverse wage markup
10Using micro-data, Barsky et. al (1997) estimate an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
0.18, implying a coefficient of relative risk aversion slightly above 5. Using macro-data, Hall (1988)
concludes that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/σ) is likely below 0.2.
11Because we use the gap measure in subsequent time series analysis, we opt for a high order
polynominal instead of a band pass filter to detrend the data. The fifth order polynominal detrended,
however, produces cycles that closely resemble those that arise from a band pass filter that removes
frequencies above 2 quarters and below either 32 or 64 quarters,
12The results are robust to simple adjustments for compositional bias of the real wage, based on
Barsky, Solon and Parker (1994).
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is the inverse price markup. What is striking about the pictures is the strong co-
movement between the gap and the (inverse) wage markup. Put differently, our
evidence suggests that the inefficiency gap seems is driven largely by countercyclical
movements in the wage markup.13
To be clear, our conclusion that countercyclical wage markup variation drives the
variation in the gap rests on the assumption that wages are allocational, and hence
that they can be used to construct a relevant cost measure.14 While this assump-
tion is standard in the literature on business cycles and markups (e.g., Rotemberg
and Woodford, 1999), it is not without controversy. Notice, however, that even if
observed wages were not allocational, our gap variable would still be correct (since
its construction does not require the use of wage data), though its decomposition
between wage and price markups would most likely be distorted by the use of an
incorrect measure of the true (shadow) cost of labor.
Table 1 reports some basic statistics that support the visual evidence in Figure
3. In particular, the Table reports a set of second moments for the gap and its
two components: the wage and price markup, and also for detrended (log) GDP, a
common indicator of the business cycle. Note first that the percent standard deviation
of the gap is large (relative to detrended output) and that departures of the gap from
steady state are highly persistent. In addition, the wage markup is nearly as volatile
as the overall gap, and is strongly negatively correlated with the latter, as well as
with detrended GDP. This confirms the visual evidence that movements in the gap
are strongly associated with countercyclical movements in the wage markup. On the
other hand, the price markup is less volatile than the wage markup and does not
exhibit a strong contemporaneous correlation with the gap15.
In Figure 4 we demonstrate that the qualitative pattern of the gap is robust to
reasonable alternative assumptions about the coefficient of relative risk aversion and
the labor supply elasticity. We first explore adjusting the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. We consider a value of 5 for this parameter, implying an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of 0.2, consistent with the evidence mentioned earlier. The
top panel of Figure 4 plots our gap variable for the case of σ = 5 versus the baseline
case of σ = 1 (In each instance we keep ϕ at its baseline value of 5). Clearly, the qual-
itative pattern is similar across the cases. The amplitude of the gap variable, though,
13As a somewhat cleaner way to illustrate the strong countercylical relation between the gap and
the wage markup, we show later that this pattern also holds conditional on a shock to monetary
policy.
14Some indirect evidence that wages are allocational is found in Sbordone (1999) and Gali and
Gertler (1999) who show that firms appear to adjust prices in response to measures of marginal cost
based on wage data. In turn, as we showed in an earlier version of this paper, they do not respond
to marginal cost measures that employ the household’s marginal rate of substitution in place of the
wage, as would be appropriate if wages were not allocational.
15However, the relatively weak co-movement of the price markup with detrended output is useful
for understanding the dynamics of inflation and the recent evidence on the New Keynesian Phillips
curve. See Sbordone (1999) and Gali and Gertler (1999).
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increases with risk aversion. Intuitively, a rise in risk aversion makes labor supply
more inelastic, which raises the sensitivity of the gap to employment fluctuations.
While the micro-evidence suggests a small labor supply elasticity, the business
cycle literature tends to assume a high elasticity, typically unity and above. We
accordingly reconstruct the gap measure assuming ϕ = 1, which implies a Frisch
labor supply elasticity of unity. The bottom panel of Figure 4 plots the behavior of
the gap under this new parametrization against the baseline case of ϕ = 5. Again, the
qualitative pattern is similar across the two cases. A higher supply elasticity, however,
does imply quantitatively smaller fluctuations in the gap. Intuitively, a more elastic
labor supply curve implies that any change in employment from its natural level will
yield a smaller change than otherwise in the distance between the labor demand and
labor supply curves.
Though we do not report the results here, it also remains true that the movements
in the gap for both the high labor supply elasticity case and the high risk aversion
case are associated largely with countercyclical movements in the wage markup. This
should not be surprising since the wage markup is computed simply as minus the
difference between the gap and the price markup, where the measure of the latter is
invariant to the labor supply elasticity.
To summarize: the results thus far suggest that the business cycle is associated
with large co-incident movements in the efficiency gap. Thus, under our framework,
the evidence suggests that countercyclical markup behavior is an important feature
of the business cycle. A decomposition of the gap, further, suggests that the counter-
cyclical movement in the wage markup is by far the most important source of overall
variations in the gap. This in turn suggests that some form of wage rigidity, either
real or nominal, may be central to business fluctuations.
Finally, we demonstrate that our gap measure is robust to alternative assumptions
about production (that yield alternative measures of the marginal product of labor.)
Our baseline case assumes constant elasticity of output with respect to hours. We
consider three alternative assumptions suggested by Rotemberg andWoodford (1999):
(i) Cobb-Douglas modified to allow for overhead labor; (ii) CES; and (iii) Cobb-
Douglas with labor adjustment costs. In each case we follow the parametrization
recommended in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). As Figure 5 indicates, our gap
measures are quite robust to these alternative assumptions. Though we do not report
the results here, it remains the case that the movements in the gap are strongly
associated with a countercyclical wage markup. For completeness, Figure 6 shows that
our results are robust to allowing for a measure of the marginal rate of substitution
based on time dependent preferences in leisure, following Eichenbaum, Hansen and
Singleton (1988).
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4 Preference Shocks, Hall’s Residual and the Gap
As we have discussed, the notion that the business cycle is associated with cyclical
movements in the gap between the labor demand curve and the observable component
of the labor supply curve originated with Hall (1997). In his baseline identification
scheme, however, Hall associated this gap entirely with preference shocks.16 In this
section we show that the high frequency movements in the gap cannot be simply due
to preference shocks.
Let us follow Hall (1997) by assuming that the marginal rate of substitution is
now augmented with a preference shock ξt that contains a cyclical component, eξt, as
well as a trend component, ξt:
mrst = ct + ϕ nt − ξt (15)
with
ξt = ξt + eξt
where we maintain our baseline assumption that the coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion, σ, is unity. Hall then defines the residual xt as the difference between the “ob-
servable” component of the marginal rate of substitution, ct+ϕ nt, and the marginal
product of labor, yt − nt :
xt ≡ (ct + ϕ nt)− (yt − nt) (16)
The issue then is how exactly to interpret the movement in Hall’s residual. Using
the augmented specification of the marginal rate of substitution allowing for prefer-
ence shocks (15), together with (8) and the definition of the inefficiency gap (1), it is
possible to express Hall’s residual as follows:
xt ≡ (mrst −mpnt) + ξt (17)
= −(µpt + µwt ) + ξt (18)
Hall’s assumption of perfect competition in both goods and labor markets implies
µpt = µ
w
t = 0. This allows him to interpret variable xt as a preference shock, since
under this assumption xt = ξt.17 Notice that under these circumstances the efficiency
gap is zero, as there are no imperfections in either goods or labor markets. On the
other hand, if preferences are not subject to shocks (ξt = 0, all t), and we allow for
16As we noted earlier, Hall does not take the preference shock hypothesis literally. However, since
it is a possible alternative to our countercyclical markup interpretation, it is worth investigating this
possibility.
17See also Baxter and King (1991). Holland and Scott (1998) construct similar measures for the
U.K.
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departures from perfect competition, xt will purely reflect movements in markups,
i.e., xt = −(µpt + µwt ). In the latter instance, Hall’s residual corresponds exactly to
our inefficiency gap, i.e.„ xt = gapt, for all t.
Note that if the Hall residual indeed reflects exogenous preference shocks, it should
be invariant to any other type of disturbance. In other words, the null hypothesis
of preference shocks implies that the Hall residual should be exogenous. We next
present two tests that reject the null of exogeneity, thus rejecting the preference
shock hypothesis.
First, we test the hypothesis of no-Granger causality from a number of variables
to our gap measure. The variables used are: detrended GDP, the nominal interest
rate, and the yield spread. Both the nominal interest rate and the yield spread may
be thought of as a rough measure of the stance of monetary policy, while detrended
GDP is just a simple cyclical indicator. Table 2 displays the p-values for several
Granger-causality tests. These statistics correspond to bivariate tests using alterna-
tive lag lengths. They indicate that the null of no Granger-causality is rejected for all
specifications, at conventional significance levels. This finding is robust to reasonable
alternative parametrizations of σ and ϕ. Overall, the evidence of Granger causality
is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the Hall residual mainly reflects variations in
preferences.
As a second test, we estimate the dynamic response of our gap variable to an
identified exogenous monetary policy shock. The identification scheme is similar to
the one proposed by Christiano et al. (1999), and others. It is based on a VAR that
includes measures of output, the price level, commodity prices, and the Federal Funds
rate, to which we add our gap measure (or, equivalently, Hall’s residual) and the price
markup. From the gap and the price markup response we can back out the behavior
of the wage markup, using equation (6). We identify the monetary policy shock
as the orthogonalized innovation to the Federal Funds rate, under the assumption
that this shock does not have a contemporaneous effect on the other variables in
the system. Figure 7 shows the estimated responses to a monetary contractionary
policy shock. The responses of the nominal rate, output and prices are similar to
those found in Christiano et al. (1999), Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and other papers
in the literature. Most interestingly for our purposes, the inefficiency gap declines
significantly in response to the unanticipated monetary tightening. Its overall pattern
of response closely mimics the response of output. This endogenous reaction, of
course, is inconsistent with the preference shock hypothesis, but fully consistent with
our hypothesis that countercyclical markups may underlie the cyclical variation in
the Hall residual. In this respect, note that the tight money shock induces a rise in
the wage markup that closely mirrors the decline in the gap, both in the shape and
the magnitude of the response. This countercyclical movement in the wage markup is
consistent with evidence on unconditional variation presented in Table 1. The price
markup also rises, though with a significant lag. Apparently, the sluggish response
of wages, which gives rise to strong countercyclical movement in the wage markup,
12
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delays the rise in the price markup.18 In any event, the decline in the inefficiency gap
is clearly associated with a countercyclical rise in markups.
To be clear, because preference shocks are not observable, it is not possible to
directly determine the overall importance of these disturbances. While our evidence
rejects the hypothesis that exogenous preference variation drives all the movement
in our gap measure, it cannot rule out the possibility that some of this movement is
due to preference shocks. Yet, to the extent that preference shocks are mainly a low
frequency phenomenon, as seems plausible under the interpretation that they largely
reflect institutional and demographic factors, then they are likely to be captured by
the trend component associated with our low frequency filter. In this instance our
filtered gap series, which isolates the high frequency movement in this variables, is
likely to be largely uncontaminated by exogenous preference variations.
5 Relation to the Output Gap
In this section we illustrate the connection between our gap measure and the output
gap, a more traditional indicator of cyclical utilization. The output gap is com-
monly meant to refer to the deviation of output from its natural level, defined as the
equilibrium value in the absence of nominal rigidities. Formally,
eyt ≡ yt − yt (19)
where eyt, and yt denote the output gap and the natural level of output, respectively.
While it is not possible to derive an exact relation between the output gap and
the inefficiency gap without specifying a complete model, we demonstrate how it
is possible to derive a relatively tight band simply conditional on a minimal set of
plausible assumptions.
First, we need a restriction on technology. For simplicity, we assume that the
reduced form aggregate production function can be written as:
yt = a nt + zt (20)
where zt is exogenous or, at least, invariant to the degree of nominal rigidities.19
Think of zt as including both technology and capital, where we treat capital as ex-
ogenous on the grounds that the percent fluctuations in capital at the business cycle
18As Gali and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (1999) observe, the sluggish behavior of the price
markup helps explain the inertial behavior of inflation, manifested in this case by the delayed and
weak response of inflation to the monetary shock. Staggered pricing models relate inflation to
an expected discounted stream of real marginal costs, which corresponds to the inverse of the price
markup. The sluggish response to the price markup translates into sluggish behavior of real marginal
cost.
19Simulations using a model with capital accumulation suggests that such an assumption is a good
approximation.
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frequency a relatively small. Note that equation (20) allows the possibility of variable
capital utilization, following Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) and King and Rebelo
(1999). Here we simply observe that variable capital utilization will raise the effective
output elasticity of employment, a. Given equation (20), we can derive the following
expression for the gap:
gapt =
µ
1− a+ ϕ
a
¶
yt + σ ct −
µ
1 + ϕ
a
¶
zt − ξt (21)
Second, we assume that the only source of gap variation lies in the presence
of nominal rigidities in labor and/or goods markets. In other words, frictionless or
desired markups are assumed to be constant. This assumption permits us to interpret
the natural level of output as the level of output consistent with a constant gap (which
corresponds to its steady state value, gap). Accordingly, if we let ct be the level of
consumption in the absence of nominal rigidities, then it follows that yt satisfies
gap =
µ
1− a+ ϕ
a
¶
yt + σ ct −
µ
1 + ϕ
a
¶
zt − ξt (22)
To obtain a relation between the output gap our demeaned gap measure dgapt ≡
gapt − gap (e.g., as portrayed in figure 2), first combine equations (21) and (22):
dgapt = µ1− a+ ϕa
¶ eyt + σect (23)
where ect = ct − ct. Without loss of generality, we can express the consumption gap,ect, as a time varying proportion of the output gap, as follows
ect = ηt eyt (24)
By establishing a reasonable band for ηt, we can derive a band for (yt − yt) as a
function of the our gap measure. To see this, notice that by substituting equation
(24) into (23), we obtain,
eyt = µ a
1 + ϕ+ a(σηt − 1)
¶ dgapt (25)
which allows us to derive upper and lower bounds for the output gap, for any give
bounds on ηt.
We illustrate the previous approach by computing the output gap for our baseline
preference specification, with σ = 1 and ϕ = 5. We follow King and Rebelo (1999),
who argue that the evidence is consistent with a value of a of roughly unity. Finally,
we consider a range of values for ηt in the interval 0.6 to 1.0. A reasonable upper bound
for ηt is unity, given that consumption is smooth relative to the durable components
of output. A reasonable lower bound is a fraction in the vicinity of 0.6, given that the
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standard deviation of consumption is roughly 0.8 the standard deviation of output,
with a correlation of roughly 0.9. (See, e.g., Campbell and Deaton, 1989.)
Figure 8 plots the output gap for both the upper and lower bounds on ηt. For
comparison, it also plots a commonly used measure of the output gap, constructed
by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Broadly speaking, our measure of the
output gap has similar properties to the CBO gap, the sample correlation between
both series being 0.74. In addition, the bands on our output gap measure turn out
to be very tight, suggesting that our estimate of that variable is relatively insensitive
to reasonable variation in ηt. These results appear to be largely robust to reasonable
choices of the labor supply elasticity parameter.
6 Welfare and the Gap
In this section we derive a simple way to measure the welfare costs of business fluctu-
ations associated with variations in our gap variable and then apply this methodology
to postwar U.S. data. In addition to obtaining a measure of the average cost of gap
fluctuations, we also apply our methodology to examining the efficiency losses during
particular episodes, including the major postwar recessions.
As we noted in the introduction, our approach differs from Lucas (1987) who con-
sidered the costs to risk averse households of the consumption variability associated
with the cycle. For roughly the same reason that the baseline neoclassical model
has difficulty accounting for the equity premium (i.e., the relatively low variability
in aggregate consumption), the Lucas approach suggests very low costs of business
fluctuations. For reasonable degrees of risk aversion, Lucas finds that households
would be willing to sacrifice less than 0.1 percent of their consumption per period
to eliminate fluctuations, clearly a small number. Many papers have extended the
Lucas approach, either to allow for incomplete markets or to allow the business cycle
to have more persistent effects on consumption variability. These papers also tend
to find small welfare costs, though with a few exceptions (e.g., Barlevy (2000) and
Beaudry and Pages (2001)).
Our approach instead measures the costs stemming from fluctuations in the degree
of inefficiency of the aggregate resource allocation, as reflected by the movements
in our gap variable.20 As in Ball and Romer (1987), the cycle generates losses on
average within our framework because the welfare effects of employment fluctuations
about the steady state are asymmetric. As Figure 1 illustrates, given that the steady
state level of employment is inefficient (due to positive steady state price and wage
markups), the efficiency costs of an employment contraction below the steady state
will exceed the benefits of a symmetric increase. In particular, note that the vertical
distance between the labor demand and supply curves rises as employment falls below
20For a very early attempt to measure the welfare cost of inefficiently high unemployment, see
Gordon (1973).
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the steady state and falls when employment moves above. The quantitative effect of
this nonlinearity on the welfare cost of fluctuations ultimately depends on the slopes
of the labor demand and supply curves. Below we show that under some plausible
parameter values the resulting net welfare cost can be substantial.
6.1 A Welfare Measure
We now proceed to derive our welfare measure. We continue to assume a produc-
tion technology with constant elasticity of output with respect to hours, as given by
equation (20). We also assume, following King and Rebelo, that the output elasticity
with respect to hours is unity (a = 1). Accordingly, equation (20) can be written (in
levels) as
Yt = Zt Nt (26)
Next, we obtain a measure of the utility gain or loss, ∆t, from reallocating em-
ployment at time t from its existing level Nt to the level that would arise in the
frictionless equilibrium, N t. Let W (Nt) be the period t utility value of output, net of
the utility cost of working, conditional on employment level Nt. Accordingly,
∆t = W (Nt)−W (N t) (27)
Assuming that, at the margin, the household is indifferent between consuming
and saving any additional unit of output, the shadow value of the latter will equal
the marginal utility of consumption. Accordingly, if U(Ct, Nt) is the period utility
function of the representative consumer, then the gross utility gain from raising em-
ployment is given by the marginal utility of consumption times the marginal product
of labor, i.e. Uc,t Zt . The cost is Un,t < 0, the marginal disutility of hours. On net
the welfare effect thus given by W 0(Nt) = Uc,t Zt + Un,t.
Ultimately, however, we are interested in an expression for the total utility gap,
∆t. If the percent difference between Nt and N t is not large, then it is reasonable to
approximateW (Nt)with a second order Taylor expansion aboutW (N t). Accordingly,
assuming that utility is separable in consumption and leisure (i.e., Ucn = 0) we have:
∆t ' [U c,tZt + Un,t] (Nt −N t) (28)
+
1
2
µ
U cc,t
∂Ct
∂Y t
Zt + Unn,t
¶
(Nt −N t)2
where, in order to lighten the notation we have defined Ut ≡ U(Ct,Nt), U t ≡
U(Ct,N t), and U ≡ U(C,N).
Assume that preferences are given by U(C,N) = C
1−σ
1−σ −
N1+ϕ
1+ϕ . Then, as we show
in the appendix, it is possible to express ∆t as the following quadratic function of
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the percent deviation of employment from its value in the frictionless equilibrium,ent ≡ log ³NtNt´:
∆t ' U c,tY t
(1 + µ)
½
µ ent − 1
2
£
ϕ+ σ(1 + µ)ηcy,t − µ
¤ en2t¾ (29)
where ηcy,t = ∂Ct∂Y t
Y t
Ct
is the elasticity of consumption with respect to output in the
frictionless equilibrium and.where, as before, µ is the steady state net markup.
Since we do not have a direct measure of the frictionless level of employment,ent is not observable. We can, however, derive a relation between ent and our gap
variable, dgapt, which is measurable. Given the production function (26), it follows
that ent = eyt. We can then obtain a relation for en in terms ofdgapt, by exploiting the
analysis of the previous section, in particular equation (25). For simplicity, we assume
ηcy,t = 1, but as in the previous section, our results are not sensitive to reasonable
variations in the parameter. Given this restriction and our earlier assumption that
a = 1, it follows that
ent = µ 1σ + ϕ
¶ dgapt (30)
Combining equations (29) and (30) then yields an expression for ∆t in terms ofdgapt :
∆t ' U c,tY t ω(dgapt) (31)
where
ω(dgapt) = 1(1 + µ)(σ + ϕ)
·
µdgapt − 12
µ
1 +
µ(σ − 1)
σ + ϕ
¶ dgap2t¸ (32)
Observe that ω(dgapt) is the efficiency loss or gain from gap deviations from its
steady value, expressed as a percent of the frictionless level of output Y t (since
ω(dgapt) = ∆t/(U c,tY t)). The first term in brackets, the linear term, reflects the
symmetric costs and benefits from the gap moving below and above the steady state,
due to the positive steady state markup µ. The second term, the quadratic term, cap-
tures the asymmetric effect of gap fluctuations on welfare. In particular, a reduction
in the gap below the steady state results in an efficiency loss that exceeds the gain
stemming from a commensurate increase in the gap above the steady state. Under
the (weak) assumption that µ(σ−1)σ+ϕ > −1, ω is a concave function of the gap, implying
that the welfare losses from gap contractions are less than made up for by the welfare
gains from symmetric gap expansions.
Finally, in keeping with the literature, we express the welfare losses from gap
fluctuations measure terms of an equivalent loss in consumption. In particular, we
divide ∆t by U c,tCt to make the metric the percent of consumption in the frictionless
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equilibrium:. Let Φ = Y/C be the steady state output/consumption ratio. Then the
efficiency loss (or gain) as a percent of Ct is given by
∆t
U c,tCt
≈ Y t
Ct
ω(dgapt) (33)
≈ Φ ω(dgapt)
where the second approximation holds under the assumption that ηcy,t ' 1.
We can use equation (33) to calculate a time series of the efficiency gain or loss
in each quarter t. To obtain a measure of the average welfare cost over time, we take
the unconditional expectation of equation (33) to obtain:
E
½
∆t
U c,tCt
¾
= − Φ
(1 + µ)(σ + ϕ)
·
1
2
µ
1 +
µ(σ − 1)
σ + ϕ
¶
var(gapt)
¸
(34)
where var(gapt) is the variance of the inefficiency gap. Notice that, as a result of
the concavity of ω, the expected welfare effects of fluctuations in the gap variable are
negative, i.e. these fluctuations imply losses in expected welfare. This loss, further, is
of “second order,” as it is linearly related to the variance of the inefficiency gap. It is,
however, potentially large, depending in particular on the magnitude var(gapt). As
section 3 suggests, var(gapt).is potentially large if labor supply is relatively inelastic
or risk aversion is relatively high.
To be clear, our approach provides a lower bound on the measure of the total
welfare costs of fluctuations. The reason is simple: it does not include the welfare costs
from efficient fluctuations in consumption and employment. To see that, suppose that
the data were generated by a real business cycle model with frictionless, perfectly
competitive markets. We should then expect to see no variation in our gap measure,
as the resource allocation would always be efficient. Our metric would then indicate no
welfare costs of fluctuations, while some losses would still be implied by the variability
of consumption and leisure (under standard convexity assumptions on preferences).
6.2 Some Numbers
Equation (33) provides a real time measure of the efficiency costs of the cycle,
∆t/U c,tCt, conditional on our gap variable, dgapt. Accordingly, we construct a quar-
terly time series of ∆t/U c,tCt, taking as input our baseline measure of the gap, based
on σ = 1 and ϕ = 5. Figure 9 plots the resulting time series over the sample 1960:IV-
99:IV. The value at each period t is interpretable as the efficiency gain or loss in
percentage units of consumption associated with the deviation of the inefficiency gap
from its steady state. The asymmetric nature of the gains and losses is clear. As
the figure shows, significant efficiency losses arise in recessions that do not appear to
be offset by commensurate gains during booms. Note also that the efficiency losses
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are largest during the major recessions, ranging between 3.0 and 3.5 percent of con-
sumption per period around the time of the respective troughs. During the major
recessions, further, these losses persist for for several years, suggesting nontrivial costs
around these periods. We return subsequently to this issue.
We next present a measure of the average welfare cost of the cycle, based on
equation (34). As we noted earlier, the measure is simply proportionate to the square
of the gap. We construct estimates for alternative values of the parameters ϕ, σ, and
µ. Recall that ϕ corresponds to the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
whereas σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We consider
three values of each of these parameters: 1, 5, and 10, implying that each of the
corresponding elasticities ranges from 1.0 to 0.1. For the parameter µ, the sum of
the steady state wage and price markups, we consider values of 0.10, 0.25, and 0.40,
which we think of as falling within a plausible range.
For a parametrization that corresponds to our baseline case of section 3 augmented
with the intermediate value of the markup (σ = 1; ϕ = 5; µ = 0.25), we estimate
the welfare cost of postwar U.S. business fluctuations to be roughly 0.26 percent of
consumption, overall a modest number, though one that is about three times the size
of Lucas’ estimate of less than 0.1 percent.
Overall, the estimated welfare costs are highly sensitive to the labor supply elas-
ticity and the intertemporal elasticities of substitution. For high values of the two
elasticities (corresponding in our case to σ = 1 and ϕ = 1), the welfare costs are
small, on the order of Lucas’ estimates. In this case, roughly speaking, the labor
supply curve is relatively flat, implying small cyclical fluctuations in the inefficiency
gap (see Figure 4.)
On the other hand, in the case of low elasticities, the costs can become fairly
significant. With ϕ = 10, implying a labor supply elasticity of 0.1, the costs vary
from of 0.6 percent of consumption for the case of σ = 1, to roughly 0.9 for the case
of σ = 10. In this latter case, the labor supply curve is very steep, implying very
large fluctuations in the inefficiency gap. It is worth noting that, while higher than
normally used in business cycle calibration exercises, values of ϕ = 10 and σ = 10
fall within the range of estimates in the literature, as we discussed in section 3.
Any measure of the average cost of business cycles obscures the fact that indi-
vidual recessionary episodes may be rather costly. What moderates the impact of
these episodes on the overall welfare measure is the fact they have been relatively
infrequent, particularly over the last several decades. One reason for this may be
that stabilization policy has been reasonably effective. Another possibility is that
the economy has been subject to smaller shocks. In either event, it is of interest to
examine efficiency losses during downturns. Doing so provides a sense of the gains
from avoiding future recessions (either by good policy or by good luck.)
We accordingly consider the two major episodes in our sample where the economy
experienced a boom followed by a deep recession; the periods 1972-77 and 1978-83.21
21We combine the 1980 and 1981-82 recessions into a single episode.
19
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO nº 0204
In each instance we measure the boom as the period where the gap variable climbs
above zero up to the point where it returns to zero. The recession is the period that
follows, where the gap turns negative up to the time it returns to steady state. For
each episode, Table 4 reports the efficiency gains from the boom and the costs from
the recession, followed by the net loss (the sum of the first two columns.)
We measure the gains and losses as a percent of one year’s consumption. In the
first row of table 4, we consider the implications of our baseline case, with σ = 1 and
ϕ = 5. In each episode, the costs of the recession outweigh the benefits of the boom,
as we might expect, given the asymmetric nature of the cyclical efficiency gains and
losses. In addition, the net cost of the cycle (last column) as well as the gross cost
of the recession (2nd column) is non-negligible. For example, the gross efficiency loss
of the 1974-75 recession was equivalent to 5.7 percent of one year’s consumption,
while the net cost after deducting the gains from the preceding boom was roughly
4.9 percent. For the 1980-82 recession, the gross and net costs were 4.3 percent and
3.3 percent, respectively.
To get a sense of the range of estimates our parametrizations imply, the next
two rows consider the polar extremes of high and low intertemporal elasticities, i.e.,
(σ = 1,ϕ = 1) versus (σ = 10,ϕ = 10). In the high elasticity case, the net costs
are modest: about 2.5 percent of one year’s consumption for the 1974-75 recession,
and about 2.2% for the 1980-82 downturn. In the low elasticity case, however, they
become significant: roughly 6.0 percent in 1974-75 and 8.5 percent in the 1980-82
Finally, we observe that our calculation ignores at least several important con-
siderations that might be leading us to understate the efficiency costs of recessions.
First, within our framework, a reduction in hours leads to increased enjoyment of
leisure, which partially offsets the impact of the output decline. In reality, workers
who are laid off during recessions do not simply get to enjoy the time off, but rather
have to look for a new job. In addition, there is often a loss of human capital that
was specific to the previous employer. Second, our calculation ignores the costs of
inflation associated with the economy moving above steady state output. For this
reason, our metric may overstate the gains from booms. To the extent that the costs
of high inflation roughly offset the efficiency gains from the boom, our measure of
the gross efficiency loss of the recession may provide a more accurate indicator of the
costs of these episodes.
7 Concluding Comments
At the risk of considerable oversimplification, it is possible to classify modern business
cycle models into two types. The first class attempts to explain quantity fluctuations
by appealing to high degrees of intertemporal substitution in an environment of fric-
tionless markets. The second instead appeals to countercyclical markups owing to
particular market frictions. Any model that produces a countercyclical movement in
the wedge between the marginal product of labor and the household’s marginal rate
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of substitution potentially falls into this class. Perhaps a central message of this paper
is that the issue of the welfare costs of business cycles cannot be cleanly separated
from the issue of which of these business cycle paradigms provides a better descrip-
tion of actual economic fluctuations. We find that with high degrees of intertemporal
substitution, the costs of business fluctuations are relatively small, which perhaps
should not be surprising since labor supply curves are relatively flat in this setting.
On the other hand, with low substitution elasticities (implying that strongly coun-
tercyclical markups are needed to explain the data), we find significant welfare costs
associated with cyclical fluctuations in the inefficiency of resource allocation. To be
sure, the appropriate parametrization of these intertemporal elasticities remains an
open question. For the time being, though, we note that there is a considerable body
of evidence consistent with the low intertemporal elasticities that we stressed in our
analysis, as discussed in section 3.
Finally, we emphasize that our estimates of the efficiency costs of business fluctu-
ations are likely to be conservative because they do not take into account the welfare
costs of inflation variability that may be associated with cyclical fluctuations. Re-
cent work by Woodford (1999) and others suggests that these efficiency costs may
be highly significant. Accounting for this factor in our overall welfare measure is
something we plan for future research.
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Table 1. Basic Statistics: 1960-1999
Baseline Calibration (σ = 1, ϕ = 5)
Variable s.d.(%) ρ Correlation
GDP Gap Price Mkup Wage Mkup
GDP 2.7 0.91 1
Gap 13.6 0.94 0.86 1
Price Markup 4.3 0.96 0.07 -0.05 1
Wage Markup 14.1 0.95 -0.85 -0.95 -0.26 1
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Table 2. Granger Causality Tests (1960-1999)
Baseline Calibration (σ = 1, ϕ = 5)
Bivariate VAR
Variable 4-lags 5-lags 6-lags
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nominal Interest Rate 0.000 0.002 0.002
Yield Spread 0.017 0.010 0.018
Note: The values reported are p-values for the null hypothesis of no Granger
causality from each variable listed to Hall’x (F-test). Filltered data using fifth order
polynomial in time.
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Table 3. Welfare Costs of Gap Fluctuations (1960-1999)
(percent average consumption)
ϕ = 1 ϕ = 5 ϕ = 10
σ = 1
µ
0.10 0.082 0.289 0.559
0.25 0.072 0.255 0.493
0.40 0.064 0.228 0.440
σ = 5
µ
0.10 0.252 0.430 0.681
0.25 0.240 0.410 0.633
0.40 0.230 0.393 0.595
σ = 10
µ
0.10 0.477 0.641 0.871
0.25 0.455 0.624 0.837
0.40 0.437 0.610 0.811
Note: Calibration a = 1. The average output consumption ratio is 1.71. The data
was filtered for the period 50:1-99:4 using a fifth order polynomial in time (e.g. Hall
(1987).) Welfare computations cover the sample period 60:1-99:4.
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Table 4 : Costs(—) and Benefits(+) of Boom/Recession Episodes
(percent of one year’s consumption)
72:2-78:1 78:2-84:1
Boom Reces. Net Boom Reces. Net
Baseline
(σ = 1, ϕ = 5, µ = 0.25) 0.8 -5.7 -4.9 1.0 -4.4 -3.4
High Elasticity
(σ = 1, ϕ = 1, µ = 0.25) 0.9 -3.4 -2.5 0.8 -3.0 -2.2
Low Elasticity
(σ = 10, ϕ = 10, µ = 0.25) 0.2 -6.2 -6.0 0.3 -9.0 -8.7
Note: See Table 3.
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Appendix
As shown in the text, the effect on welfare of a deviation from the frictionless level
of employment can be approximated by
∆t '
¡
U c,tZt + Un,t
¢
(Nt −N t) +
1
2
µ
U cc,t
∂Ct
∂Y t
Zt + Unn,t
¶
(Nt −N t)2 + o(kak3)
where o(kakn) represents terms that are of order higher than nth, in the bound kak
on the amplitude of the relevant shocks. A straightforward manipulation yields
∆t ' U c,tY t
µ
1 +
Un,t
U c,tZt
¶µ
Nt −N t
N t
¶
+
1
2
µ
U cc,tCt
U c,t
ηcy,t +
Un,t
U c,tZt
Unn,tN t
Un,t
¶µ
Nt −N t
N t
¶2
We now make use of the second order approximation of relative deviations in
terms of log deviations:
X −X
X
= ex+ 1
2
ex2 + o(kak3)
where ex ≡ log ¡X
X
¢
. Hence, the previous expression for ∆t can be written as
∆t ' U c,tY t
½µ
1− 1
1 + µ
¶µent + 1
2
en2t¶− 12
µ
σηcy,t +
ϕ
1 + µ
¶ en2t¾ ,
where ηcy,t = ∂Ct∂Y t
Y t
Ct
is the elasticity of consumption with respect to output in the
frictionless equilibirum, and we have used that MPNt = YtNt = Zt,
Un,t
Uc,t
/MPN t =
GAP = 1
1+µ
, Ucc,tCt
Uc,t
= σ, and Unn,tNt
Un,t
= ϕ. Finally, from the previous expression it is
straightforward to obtain the expression for ∆t that is in the main text:
∆t ≈
U c,tY t
(1 + µ)
½
µ ent − 1
2
£
ϕ+ σ(1 + µ)ηcy,t − µ
¤ en2t¾
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Figure 1. The Gap: A Diagrammatic Exposition 
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Figure 2. The Gap 
Baseline Calibration (σ=1, φ=5) 
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Figure 3. The Gap and the Wage Markup 
Baseline Calibration 
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Figure 4. The Gap under Alternative Calibrations 
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Figure 5 . The Gap under Alternative Marginal Cost Measures 
Baseline Calibration 
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Figure 6.  The Gap under Non-Separable Preferences 
Parameter Values: σ=1, φ=5, β=0.99, b=0.8 
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Figure 7. Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks 
Baseline Calibration 
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Figure 8.  Theory-based vs. CBO based Output Gap 
Baseline Calibration (σ=1, φ=5, µ=0.25) 
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Figure 9.  The Welfare Effects of Postwar U.S. Fluctuations 
Baseline Calibration (σ=1, φ=5, µ=0.25) 
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